Australian public anger over the management of the Bali Nine drugs case against broader issues of national interest, especially Indonesia's role in managing regional terrorism. 3 In a double appeasement, the prime minister at the time of the Bali Nine conviction expressed his 'regret' about the cases, while insisting that this was nevertheless a simple matter of Indonesia's sovereign right to determine its own internal modes of governance, law and control of narcotics trading.
Very clearly, conservative commentators recognised that drugs issues and the respective legislative and cultural differences between the two countries threatened to further destabilise an already precarious bilateral relationship. At the time, commentators like Tim Lindsey, for example, argued that prosecutions against foreign drugs traffickers, such as Schapelle Corby and the Bali Nine, were a legitimate response to Indonesia's narcotics crisis and the significant threat it poses to community wellbeing and security. 4 Even more pointedly, Mick Keelty, the head of the Australian Federal Police, continually confirmed the legitimacy of these laws, subsuming the lives of the Australian drugs couriers to the greater good of national security and the global war on terror. As a key player in the fight against international terrorism, the Indonesian government was not to be antagonised for the sake of a few Australian wrongdoers.
Indeed the former head of Indonesia's National Narcotics Board, Major This essay examines the ways in which the illicit drugs trade and terrorism are connected in Indonesia. In particular, we examine the various points of intersection that have been postulated and the ways in which the discourses of narco-terrorism are implicated in various forms of transnational and global cultural politics. We reflect on the way these postulations are framed within a media context that is clearly constituted around the current 'war on terror' and a re-invigorated East-West divide.
As with much cultural studies scholarship, this essay uses a transdisciplinary approach. Rather than using a single theoretical framework, we integrate research from disciplines such as media studies, security and terrorism studies and drug research, with theoretical perspectives on desire, excess and capitalism offered by Baudrillard, Lacan and others. Our aim is to locate the issues of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism within the context of a globalising economy of desire-and to illuminate the complex dimensions of their mediation.
The specific article to which we refer is titled 'Life after Death'. 6 We will make reference to this article and the journalist's interview practice (which we observed in Krobokan) throughout the essay. Indeed, just as desire and pleasure represent the centrifugal force of the legal economy, they are also central to the illicit narcotics industry and to drug use itself. For Indonesia, in particular, this alignment is underpinned by the country's extreme levels of poverty and underdevelopment. Despite reasonable economic growth and an expanding middle-class, Indonesia has a GNP per capita of less than $US4000 per annum and a poverty rate of around 16 per cent, indicators that are likely to decline during the course of the global financial crisis. 13 The inefficiencies in the economy are further exacerbated by endemic public and private corruption which contributes to, and is a symptom of, seriously low levels of international and domestic investment. lower-level workers. In this sense, there is clearly an overlap between the recruitment of young sub-class Indonesians into the narcotics industry, and into the ranks of militant jihadism to act as footsoldiers and suicide bombers. 18 In both cases, these young people seek some form of pathway through, against or beyond the system that so bleakly oppresses them.
-NARCO-TERRORISM At least in an economic sense, the relationship between drugs and Islamist terrorism is a good deal more complex than first presumed. Indeed, as we noted earlier, the former head of the Indonesian Drugs Board, Major General Pastika, has identified considerable and growing overlap between Islamist terrorism and organised crime.
This 'narco-terrorism', identified as a worldwide phenomenon, is constituted around a confluence of interests and criminal infrastructure. 19 The commercial and economic value of illicit drugs has been recognised by the criminal underworld in Indonesia, including the clandestine networks of regional and global jihadists.
Organisations like al-Qa'ida have engaged directly in narcotics trading, operating through various parts of Afghanistan and into Burma and South East Asia. The confluence of narco-terrorism and public corruption in Indonesia remains shadowy, of course. The density of corruption and the force of the clandestine economy in Indonesia continue to restrict the capacity of the AntiCorruption Commission to identify and prosecute individuals who are engaged in organised crime, including drugs trafficking and political violence.
-NARCOTIC TERROR AND THE ECONOMY OF DESIRE
There is yet a further overlap between illicit drugs and political violence in Indonesia, most particularly through the interflows of globalisation and culture. In order to understand this dimension of the overlap, we need to understand that contemporary 'terrorism' is largely a communicational act and is profoundly embedded in culture and a mediated global public sphere or 'mediasphere'. 28 Thus, as many definitions now clearly acknowledge, the objective of contemporary terrorism as a mode of political violence is to communicate a message to governments, communities and individuals who are not the immediate victims of the attack. 29 The terror that is created by the attack is designed either to frighten and persuade enemies, or attract recruits and supporters to a given political cause.
In this way, the current phase of global terrorism is constituted around complex wars of meaning and 'language', as they are amplified through the modern global media. However, while former British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher, famously stated that 'publicity is the oxygen of terrorism', this 'oxygen' is the lifesource of all modern politics; terrorism is a player in a political sphere that is constructed essentially around 'mediated' broadcasting and networked information systems. Significantly, these broadcast and networked systems are created through broader economic systems and ideologies which are, as we noted earlier, shaped through consumer culture. In this sense, the 'clash of civilizations', 30 which is being invigorated through Islamist militancy and the antithetical 'war on terror', is being shaped through an 'East-West' divide that is itself being propagated through contemporary media politics. Jihadists, thereby, promote their interests as traditional Islam, while the 'West' invokes a powerful rhetoric of modernisation.
Both discourses, however, operate within the context of a contemporary mediasphere with modes of cultural agonism that are essentially modern and forged around consumer capitalism, desiring bodies and spiritual transcendence. Jean Baudrillard has argued that modern terrorism is in fact the inevitable reciprocate of globalisation; 31 it is perhaps more accurate to regard Islamist jihadism as a part of the complex cultural elements, contests and flows which are forming around globalisation processes. Clearly, consumer capitalism is predicated on infinite demand for product (image, experience, service), which in turn is a contingency of the perpetual stimulation of desire in desiring bodies. Where desire exceeds itself, there can be no satisfaction, even though that satisfaction is inscribed in the mobilisation of that desire. Indeed, the satisfaction of desire can only ever be partial in capitalist economics, as complete satisfaction would endanger the very premise of the system itself. Capitalist production realised a long time ago that both dissatisfaction and stimulation had to be inscribed into the process of desiring, otherwise the whole system would collapse. Baudrillard himself recognises this paradox, arguing that product has to be transformed into image to ensure the robustness of the system; but this 'simulacra', which is bonded to human libido, can never be complete or grounded as it must always lead to further stimulation, desire is conveyed within the spectre of its ephemera, as well as the crashing complexity and ordinariness of everyday life.
In this way, drugs are not merely an extension of the capitalist propagated fantasy of infinite pleasure: they might also be a reaction against it. Jean Baudrillard has noted that, in an economic system that is constituted around the perpetual arousal of desire and the impossibility of its gratification, social agents are trapped in a cycle of impossible materiality. 33 To this end, the drug takers may seek to challenge this fatuous volition-even as they are seduced by its fantasy of infinite pleasure. Thus, just as the jihadists are seeking grace through the manipulation of the capitalist system, drug users and drug traffickers are expressing a sensibility of excess which generates its own highly negative consequences-social and personal.
The Islamist militants targeted the Kuta nightclubs in the 2002 Bali attacks largely as a symbolic reproach, a way of damning and denouncing the culture they believe is oppressing Muslims.
34 And yet the clubbers and drugs culture that haunts the shadows of the Kuta night strip are also victims of the same implausible fantasy of pleasure and its volition to excess. To this end, both the attackers and the victims were assembled around the totem of this excess, even though their imagining of each other seems utterly divergent.
Thus, as much as they abhorred the hedonism they attached to their victims, the Bali bombers were also entranced by its power and aesthetic. In a peculiar double helix the bombers and the clubbers were engaged in an invisible battle by which the violence of the attack and the indulgence of the pleasure were juxtaposed through a surge of human confusion. A war of terror being waged elsewhere presented itself as a fundamental contest of meanings over the territory of a nightclub. Spiritual grace and bodily ecstasy were entwined through the helix of bodies that left bomber and victim in an indistinguishable rubble.
While it may be simpler to see these bodies as divisible antagonists within a global war of terror, the conceptual conflation of 'narco-terrorism' suggests something more complex. We have already suggested that the force of privation and a broader sense of social disillusion is a common driver for drug traffickers and militant jihadists in Indonesia. And we are suggesting here that the culture of illicit narcotics and that of jihadism may be wrought through a common impetus to excess and a paradoxical relationship with the desire-dissatisfaction compound that mobilises capitalist consumerism and the dynamic of pleasure. In this context, Scott
Rush's explanation for his engagement with drug smuggling-that he wanted a 'holiday'-becomes a metaphor for this same dynamic and for the broader culture in which 'the holiday' is imagined. Yet the harm that is caused by drug abuse and trafficking is very similar in Indonesia as it is in Australia-and as we have argued, the causes are also very similar. While there are increasing debates in the more sensible realms of Indonesian narcotics management, there continues to be a tepid policy response to this significant source of social harm. 35 Drugs, like crime more generally, represent a convenient political rallying point for the assertion of state authority. President
Yudhoyono has stated that 'deterrence and the interests of justice justify the use of the death penalty for drug charges' and that those involved in the narcotics trade do not deserve leniency. 36 He has also made it clear that he would not grant clemency to those sentenced to death for drug trafficking. 37 Community vigilantes and conservative lobby groups (including Islamists) use the drugs issue as a focus for community action and political expression. As the Indonesian Narcotics Board itself has recognised, these groups tend to treat drug traffickers and users as a fundamental social enemy. The Australian government has failed to substantially engage with Indonesia around drugs issues, retreating once more into the national sovereignty, security and law-enforcement discourse rather than engaging in dialogue over the management of the health and social problems associated with drugs.
The journalist in Krobokan Prison scoffs at this notion. Nevertheless, the media he represents are part of the economy of desire which lies at the heart of these issues. Having surrendered much of its role as 'fourth estate' and agent of public interest, the networked commercial media almost entirely engages its audiences and readers through various forms of entertainment. To this end, the contemporary, commercial media is largely constituted around images and narratives which stimulate emotional, as much as cognitive responses. As we noted above, these images and narratives are formed as 'simulacra' which is designed to The state's imposition of the death penalty, however, is a capitulation to its own desperate failings. In an act of simple vengeance, the Indonesian state, supported by a complicit Australian government, obfuscates its own culpability through its decree of sanctioned murder. 40 
